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Introduction: Bans and Walls: Trying to Undo Demographic Diversity 
In the U.S. we have an administration that dresses itself in nationalism, national 
security, and supposedly raceblind/color blind ideologies that are paired with 
policies that are racist and encourage racial profiling and harassment. New 
executive orders on travel, interior enforcement, and border security contradict 
the 1965 and 1986 immigration laws that removed overtly racist components of 
immigration laws that had shaped U.S. policy since the 1920s and reshaped U.S. 
racial geography in the past 50 years (Omi and Winant 2012: 319).  Past 
changes in immigration law moved away from a national origins quota system to 
a focus on family unification and skilled migrants.  Reforms of immigration law 
from the past century resulted in about 50 percent of migrants who have arrived 
since 1965 being from Latin America and one quarter being from Asia (Pew 
2015).  A 2015 Pew Report suggests that by 2055, Asian immigrants will become 
the largest immigrant group. Non-Hispanic whites are predicted to become less 
than half of the U.S. population by 2055 and 46 percent by 2065. No one racial or 
ethnic group will constitute a majority and Hispanics will constitute 24 percent of 
the overall population by 2065 and Asians will be 14% of the total by that same 
date (Pew 2015). Earlier immigration waves from the mid-19th century to the early 
20th century were almost entirely made up of people from Europe. The backlash 
to this ongoing dramatic demographic shift has gone from the political margins to 
the political center and is becoming normalized.  
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We are living in a moment characterized by both a thinly veiled colorblind 
ideology that acts as a cover for white supremacy and official policies that are 
racialized and target nationalities, religions and regions of the world. The twice-
challenged travel bans on six countries are explicit in excluding people from 
Muslim majority countries and the new executive orders on “Enhancing public 
Security in the Interior of the U.S.” and "Border Security and Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements” are specifically aimed at Mexico and Mexicans 
through the proposed construction of a wall and calling for removal of all of those 
who are undocumented. This is a large group of 11 million people: 5.8 million 
Mexicans, 700,000 Salvadorans, 525,000 Guatemalans, 3450,000 Hondurans as 
well as 500,000 people from India, 325,000 people from China, 180,000 from the 
Philippines, 160,000 from Korea, 100,000 from Haiti, 100,000 from Canada, 
275,000 people from various African countries, 140,000 from the Middle East and 
500,000 from various European countries (Passell 2016). Outside of half a million 
people from Europe, most of these undocumented immigrants are from majority 
non-white countries.1 Thus we have a set of executive orders that engage in 
what we could effectively call racial and religious targeting and exclusion with no 
accommodation for how the 11 million people, many of whom have lived in the 
U.S. for more than a decade, can earn a path to citizenship. This despite the fact 
that in a recent CNN/ORC poll of 1, 025 Americans 60 percent stated that in 
terms of how the U.S. government deals with the issue of illegal immigration they 
supported, “developing a plan to allow those in the U.S. who have jobs to 
become legal residents.” When the question is further specified to how the U.S. 
government should treat “ illegal immigrants who have been in this country for a 
number of years, hold a job, speak English, and are willing to pay back taxes,” 90 
percent say they would favor a bill that allowed “those immigrants to stay in this 
country rather than being deported and eventually allow them to apply for US. 
Citizenship” (CNN/ORC International 2017).  Given these realities and the 
complex political and economic integration between the U.S. and Mexico and the 
rest of the world, it seems to me that we cannot abandon a transborder 
framework. I want to illustrate the ongoing importance of a transborder 
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framework by discussing the transborder political economy that ties together the 
U.S. and Mexico through many different relationships. 
  
Trade and Jobs 
As many have pointed out, the U.S. and Mexican economies are intimately 
bound not only since NAFTA but before. The walling off of Mexico has emerged 
with the physical proposal of a 50-foot concrete wall that MIT engineers 
estimated would cost up to US$40 billion (Huffington Post Canada 2016). The 
wall has been further constructed rhetorically by Donald Trump. In February of 
2017, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Homeland Security Secretary 
John Kelly took a two-day visit to Mexico to “smooth over” relations. The trip was 
headlined in some papers by Trump’s statements in the White House to 
manufacturers that “Con México tendremos una buena relación, y si no, no" (We 
will have a good relationship with Mexico, and if not, then not”). (La Jornada 
2017). In 2015, Mexico was the third largest goods trading partner of the U.S. 
with $531 billion in total (two way) goods trade during 2015. Goods exports 
totaled $236 billion; goods imports totaled $295 billion. The U.S. goods trade 
deficit with Mexico was $58 billion in 2015. 
According to the Department of Commerce, U.S. exports of goods and 
services to Mexico supported an estimated 1.1 million jobs in 2014 (All previous 
figures from Office of U.S. Trade Representative 2016). Some sources put that 
figure as high as 6 million jobs. Trump has stated that he wants to renegotiate 
NAFTA because it has resulted in a loss of 30 percent of U.S. manufacturing 
jobs. He has not considered the jobs that NAFTA creates in the U.S. through 
exports of goods and services. The primary cause of the loss of manufacturing 
jobs is automation, not jobs lost to Mexico. Mexico in turn has lost jobs to other 
countries. A million young people still come of age every year in Mexico and 
there is nothing near full employment for them.  
Mexican workers in the U.S. sent home approximately 25 billion dollars 
(24.8 billion) in remittances in 2015, according to the Bank of Mexico, overtaking 
oil revenues as a source of foreign income for the first time and floating a 
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significant part of the Mexico’s economy, particularly in some parts of the country 
(Associated Press 2016). Between “January and November of 2016, $24.6 billion 
flowed back to the pockets of Mexicans from friends and relatives living 
overseas” (Gillespie 2017). This is Mexico’s largest official flow of cash. I will 
return to this topic with the discussion of the “unofficial flow" below. 
Undocumented Mexican workers also pay into social security in the U.S. that 
benefits not them, but many older Americans. Returning undocumented people 
to Mexico, taking them out of the U.S. economy will have many negative 
consequences in Mexico and in the U.S.  
 
Unofficial Cash: The Wall, the Transborder Drug Business,  
and Declining U.S. Health 
There is a great deal of complexity to Trump’s discussion of “making Mexico pay” 
for the wall. Part of his January 25th “Executive Order: Border Security and 
Immigration Enforcement Improvements” calls for “In accordance with existing 
law, including the Secure Fence Act and IIRIRA, take all appropriate steps to 
immediately plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern 
border, using appropriate materials and technology to most effectively achieve 
complete operational control of the southern border” (Trump 2017a). 
There is already a barrier that blocks people and vehicles along 653 miles 
of the U.S.-Mexico border that began in 1997.  The additional 1,317 miles lack 
fencing but for much of that the Rio Grande is a natural border. Building just 413 
more miles would cost between $21.6 billion according to an estimate by 
Homeland Security (WOLA 2017) and $44 billion according to MIT engineers. 
This will add to the $25 billion the Department of Homeland Security already 
spends annually to repair existing fences (WOLA 2017).  
The vast majority of drugs smuggled into the U.S. come through legal 
ports of entry, hidden amidst legitimate merchandise on trucks, and in passenger 
vehicles. A report from the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Drug 
Intelligence Center published in 2010 reported that  “Mexican DTOs dominate the 
transportation of illicit drugs across the Southwest Border. They typically use 
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commercial trucks and private and rental vehicles to smuggle cocaine, 
marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin through the 25 land POEs as well as 
through vast areas of desert and mountainous terrain between POEs” (U.S. 
Department of Justice 2010). Drug trafficking organizations control smuggling 
routes into the U.S. for people and drugs. If the U.S.-Mexico wall is enlarged it 
will most likely directly benefit the same drug trafficking organizations it is 
supposed to harm, adding to their profits and control of major corridors on the 
U.S.-Mexico border and within both countries. 
The RAND Drug Policy Research Center published a 2014 report for the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy that tracked the total expenditures, 
consumption and number of users of marijuana, cocaine (including crack), heroin 
and methamphetamine. While the demand for certain drugs varied over the 
course of the decade from 2004-2014, overall spending on illegal substances 
remained consistent at roughly $100 billion per year (Kikmer et. Al 2014: ). A 
2012 report of the Woodow Wilson Center put that figure as high as 150 billion 
(Bagley 2012: 2). Estimates of drug sales vary wildly, with the Justice 
Department saying in 2009 that Mexican and Colombian cartels sold anywhere 
from $18 billion to $39 billion worth of drugs in North America each year 
(Stanford 2017).  
What is not in doubt is that deaths from drug overdoses have increased 
and the market for heroine is growing in the U.S.  From 1999 to the present, 
deaths from drug overdoses have doubled. In 2014, 29,230 people died in car 
accidents and 47,055 died from drug overdoses. In 2015, 25 percent of overdose 
deaths were from heroine (Nolan and Amica 2016, Rudd et. Al. 2016). In 1999 
just 6 percent of overdose deaths were from heroine. According to  the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy,” there are currently around 1.5 million consumers 
of heroin in the U.S. The Office estimates the value of the market at $27 million” 
(Woldenberg, Laura 2016).  The impact of the expansion of the opioid market 
can partially be seen in relation to the declining health of middle-aged and older 
white men and women.  A study published by economists Ann Case and Angus 
Deaton in 2015, found that since 1999, death rates have been rising for 
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uneducated, non-Hispanic, white Americans between the ages of 45 and 54. 
They suggest this reversal is strongly related to rates of drug poisonings, 
suicides, and alcohol-related liver disease (Case and Deaton 2015). Further 
study of the CDC data they used by the Commonwealth Institute found that it 
was more complex. An article by Ola Khazan published in the Atlantic in January 
of 2016 based on the re-analysis, found that death rates for middle-aged whites 
with low levels of education failed to decline as people elsewhere live longer and 
healthier not just due to drug overdoses and suicides. They were also dying of 
diseases that usually kill people later in life. “That means not only are middle-
aged white people drinking more, using more opioids, and killing themselves at 
higher rates, more of them are getting sick with the diseases that usually kill older 
people. And when they do get sick, they don’t get better” (Khazan 2016).   
Mexico is currently the main provider of heroine to the US, and the third 
most important opium producer in the world (Woldenberg 2016). The state of 
Guerrero now occupies a top spot in the production of opium and transshipment 
of opium from Mexico to the U.S. Until about 2009, the Beltrán-Leyva cartel 
controlled heroine production until most of its leaders were killed or fled and the 
organization fell apart. Since then, several spin-off and splinter organizations 
such as the Rojos, the Guerreros Unidos, The Tequileros, and the Ardillos have 
been fighting each other to gain control of cities and towns and to control 
subsidiary businesses such as kidnapping and extortion. The same organizations 
that produce and traffic heroine into the U.S. from states like Guerrero will benefit 
from more wall. The most credible theory to explain why 45 Mexican students 
were disappeared in Igauala, Guerrero in September of 2014 was that they 
commandeered the wrong bus. They probably got on a bus that had a large 
opium shipment headed for Chicago.  
 
Higher Prices for Border Crossings and the Fantasma of “Bad Hombres” 
Disguised as Women and Children Coming in to the U.S.  
One clear outcome of a wall will be that the prices charged by coyotes for coming 
to the U.S. will rise again, as getting over the border becomes even harder. 
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There was a very dramatic increase in smuggling prices after the current wall 
was constructed beginning in 1996. Before that time coyotes charged about $200 
in Tijuana and a majority of people didn’t use coyotes, according to migrants I 
interviewed in the 1990s.  Now fees to come to the U.S. from Mexico range from 
between $4000 and $9000 depending on how people arrive (with passport 
waved through port of entry, in truck, through desert). The price is rising. Recent 
reports from Mexico such as one called “El Efecto Trump” published by the 
Excelsior Newspaper reports that until November of last year crossing through 
rugged terrain cost 3,500 dollars per person. In January, the price went up to 
8,000. The cost of crossing with a “valid” visa of someone who you look like has 
risen to about $12,000 (Mena 2017). Estimates of income for smugglers profiting 
from human smuggling from Latin America to U.S. was 6.6 billion in 2010 UN 
report (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes 2010: 15).  This number has 
surely increased since 2010 and will go up even more with the expanded wall 
between the U.S. and Mexico.  
Last summer when I was conducting fieldwork in Guatemala I found that 
the average price to try to get to the U.S. from western Guatemala 
(Huehuetenango) was about $8,000.00. A significant part of these fees are paid 
as “head taxes” to organized crime groups who control routes and access points 
in Mexico and at the border as well as in bribes inside of Mexico. Four of the 
women I have recently worked with in preparing their asylum case declarations 
described crossing the Guatemalan-Mexican border and then riding by bus up to 
the U.S. border and attempting to cross at various points in Arizona. They all 
described bribes paid to Mexican immigration officials and other “taxes” 
associated with their journeys to the U.S. which were on top of the regular price 
of $8,000.00. Prices from Central America are also sure to be on the rise.  And at 
a time when overall apprehensions are way down.  
The number of undocumented migrants apprehended on the U.S.-
Mexican border is at its lowest level since the 1970s. There is a slight increase in 
overall apprehensions but more are from Central America. They are primarily 
women and children who are not trying to avoid capture but are walking into the 
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U.S. and asking for asylum at legal ports of entry. They are fleeing for their lives. 
This is despite the fact that the U.S. has been pressuring and funding a harsh 
deportation policy in Mexico called the Southern Border Program. Started in 
2014, this program has dramatically decreased detentions and deportations of 
Central Americans in Mexico. 153,295 Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and 
Hondurans were detained at Mexico’s southern Border in FY 2016 and almost all 
were deported (Isacson 2016).   
During fiscal year 2014, U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported 
apprehending 68,541 unaccompanied minors, a 77 percent increase from the 
previous fiscal year.  Seventy five percent of the unaccompanied children 
apprehended in FY 2014 were from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 
(Stinchcomb and Hershberg 2014:6). Most of the remaining children were from 
Mexico. While in fiscal year 2015 apprehensions of Central American 
unaccompanied minors on the U.S.-Mexico border decreased due to increased 
deportations from Mexico to Central America and a U.S. public information 
campaign to discourage children from coming, during fiscal year 2016 (October 
2015- October 2016), the numbered spiked again to  
59, 692 unaccompanied children and 18,913 were from Guatemala (U.S. 
Customs and Border Protections 2016).  
In fiscal year 2014, 68,445 family units were apprehended at the U.S. 
border. In 2015 these numbers decreased, but rose again during fiscal year 2016 
to 77, 674 and 23,067 of these family units were from Guatemala (U.S. Customs 
and Border Protections 2016). The thousands of undocumented women who 
were a part of this migration were largely invisible in most media depictions.   
Like the children, undocumented women are often fleeing conditions of horrible 
violence, abuse, poverty and hunger. And many are fleeing communities and 
regions controlled by drug trafficking organizations who make and ship opioids 
and meth. Importantly, they are seeking to reunite with family members.  
 
Re-examining U.S. Aid to Mexico: Plan Merida and Human Rights 
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In addition to outlining provisions for building a physical wall, The Executive 
Order titled “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,” also 
states, “The head of each executive department and agency shall identify and 
quantify all sources of direct and indirect Federal aid or assistance to the 
Government of Mexico on an annual basis over the past five years, including all 
bilateral and multilateral development aid, economic assistance, humanitarian 
aid, and military aid.  Within 30 days of the date of this order, the head of each 
executive department and agency shall submit this information to the Secretary 
of State” (Trump 2017a).  
The biggest chunk of assistance that the U.S. has given Mexico is for an 
initiative known as about Plan Merida, a bilateral partnership begun in 2007 that 
focuses on fighting organized criminal groups, re-engineering the judicial system, 
modernizing the border between the two countries and strengthening civil society 
groups . According to the U.S. Department of State, “The U.S. Congress has 
appropriated $2.5 billion since the Merida Initiative began in Fiscal Year 2008” 
(U.S. Department of State 2017). The vast majority of this aid is funneled into the 
disastrous and failed war on drugs. Its stated goal is to support Mexico’s security 
forces, especially (but not exclusively) for counter-narcotics efforts, ostensibly 
aimed at disrupting the flow of drugs and dismantling drug trafficking 
organizations. Plan Mexico (now the Merida Initiative) actually began as a three-
year plan under the administration of George W. Bush. President Barack Obama 
extended Plan Merida through his administration and it may now be open to 
revision under Trump’s new executive order that calls for reassessing aid to 
Mexico.  
What have been the results of Plan Mexico?  Human rights activists such 
as the parents and family members of the 43 student teachers from Ayotzinapa 
who disappeared in Igauala, Guerrero in September of 2014 mention the 
following results in appearances I have attended in the U.S. in Oregon: mass 
graves in Guerrero, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, and other states with hundreds of 
unidentified bodies; widespread disappearances; a huge rise in the violation of 
rights and safety of transmigrants in Mexico; increased femicides, and a dramatic 
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increase in human rights violations by Mexican security forces, including 
thousands of documented cases of torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial 
executions. In an interview with Amy Goodman of Democracy Now in April of 
2015, Antonio Tizapa who is the father of missing student Jorge Antonio Tizapa 
Legideño, commented: 
Well, what I would tell to President Obama is to stop supporting Plan 
Mérida, because the weapons, the arms, with those weapons that are 
supposedly supporting the war against drugs, those arms are being used 
to annihilate our students. I ask him to stop that aid. That is what we ask 
of him, the parents and all the citizens of Mexico, because we are going 
through a very difficult situation. It is not possible that just because one is 
a student, they assassinate you. So, please, no more aid to Mexico in the 
weapons system (Goodman 2015).  
Donald Trump is proposing to perhaps re-evaluate the funds from the 
Merida Initiative and use them in building the wall he is proposing and to help 
hire 5,000 new Border Patrol agents and 10,000 new ICE agents. Human rights 
activists in Mexico have long called on U.S. concerned citizens to stop the Plan 
Merida because of the negative impact it has had on human rights. But they did 
not ask to have it stopped to build the wall or to increase border and interior 
immigration enforcement through increased hiring of agents.  
A transborder analysis provides us with an excellent set of tools for 
discerning the complex official and unofficial political economy that ties together 
the U.S., Mexico, Central America and our larger hemisphere, with varying 
results on the bodies of men, women, and children differentiated by race, 
ethnicity, class, region, age, education, and more. Walling off our analysis to only 
peer inside the container of the nation-state makes these relationships invisible. 
The gap between actual and expected mortality in 2014 for white, middle-aged, 
lower educated men and women in West Virginia, which was 273 deaths per 
100,000 people (Squires and Blumenthal 2016), and Guerrero’s 2014 statistic of 
12.8 murders per 100,000 women--about five times higher than the global 
average—are connected (Lewis 2014). A multi-level transborder analysis makes 
Konturen IX (2017) 
	
23 
it possible to “see” and “feel” the “facts” of economic, political, and social 
integration in the hemisphere. 
 
 
 																																																								
1 These numbers and places are also tied to the historic number of 65.3 million 
people who were displaced as of the end of 2015 according to UNHCR. 
“Measured against Earth’s 7.349 billion population, these numbers mean that 1 in 
every 113 people globally is now either an asylum-seeker, internally displaced or 
a refugee (UNHCR 2015). About half of these refugees are children.   	
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